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Abstract 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon that several scholars studied in an attempt of 
understanding it better. It affects the economic growth both directly and indirectly, through 
several transmission channels.  
We will study the impact of corruption on economic growth of a group of countries that 
was not considered before, the Saconne (2017)’s selection of 39 Emerging Economies, 
which represent more than the half of the world’s population. Additionally, we will 
consider variables that are more general in order to be possible to compare the results on 
Emerging Economies with other countries. Although there are several studies that study 
the impact of corruption on economic growth, their analyses use different methods, 
considering different variables and countries than our study. 
Using data from World Bank and considering a panel data with a sample of 4557 
observations from 158 countries over the period between 1995 and 2015, we estimated the 
impact of corruption on economic growth. 
The results suggest that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, 
corroborating the majority of the extant studies and reinforcing the “sand in the wheels” 
theory. Additionally, the evidence gathered sustain that the impact that corruption has on 
Emerging Economies is similar to that of the remaining economies. 
 
JEL codes: C23; C31; D73; O47. 
Key words: Corruption; Economic Growth; Emerging Economies; OLS Regression. 
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Resumo 
A corrupção é um fenómeno complexo que vários investigadores estudaram na tentativa de 
compreendê-lo melhor. É algo que afeta o crescimento económico, directa e indiretamente 
através the inúmeros canais de transmissão. 
Apesar de existirem muitos estudos sobre o seu impacto no crescimento económico, são 
utilizados outros métodos, variáveis e países na sua análise. No nosso estudo, 
consideraremos um grupo de países que não foi considerado em investigações anteriores, 
que é a seleção de 39 Economias Emergente feita pela autora Saconne e que representam 
mais de metade da população mundial. Adicionalmente, nos nossos modelos vamos utilizar 
variáveis que são mais genéricas, permitindo uma maior facilidade e coerência na 
comparação de resultados entre as Economias Emergentes e outros países.  
Através do uso de dados disponibilizados pelo Banco Mundial e considerando um painel 
com 4557 observações referentes a 158 países para o período compreendido entre 1995 e 
2015, estimamos o impacto da corrupção no crescimento económico.  
Os resultados sugerem que a corrupção tem um impacto negativo no crescimento 
económico, corroborando, assim, a maioria dos estudos e reforçando a teoria de “sand in the 
wheels”. Adicionalmente, as evidências alcançadas sustentam que o impacto que a corrupção 
tem nas Economias Emergente é semelhante ao observado nas restantes economias. 
 
 
Códigos JEL: C23; C31; D73; O47. 
Palavras-chave: Corrupção; Crescimento Económico; Economias Emergentes; Regressões 
dos Mínimos Quadrados. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The topic of corruption is widely studied by numerous scholars (e.g., Huang, 2016; Li, 2016; 
Gutmann and Lucas, 2017; Lisciandra and Millemaci, 2017) with empirical evidence 
showing that, in general, corruption is counter-productive for countries’ economic 
performance (Mauro, 1995; Rose–Ackerman, 1997; Jain, 2001; Li, 2016; Lisciandra and 
Millemaci, 2017). Nonetheless, among the multitude of studies that deal with this subject, 
some of them find no link between corruption and economic performance (e.g., Huang, 
2016) and there are even a few countries where corruption seems to be beneficial for 
economic growth, by ‘greasing the wheels’ (Bangladesh, Paul, 2010 and South Korea, 
Huang, 2016). 
In spite of being difficult to define precisely what is corruption, there is a general 
agreement that it is related with the gains obtained by public servants through means that 
are not in accordance with laws and regulations (Jain, 2001). In a more simplistic way, it is 
the abuse of authority by public servants in law enforcement for private benefit (Gutmann 
and Lucas, 2017). This indicates that corruption is fuelled by restrictive regulations. Thus, 
actions related with fraud, money laundering, drug exchanges and trades in the parallel 
economy without the intervention of a public servant cannot be considered corruption 
because they do not involve the use of public power (Jain, 2001). 
There are a variety of ways by which corruption is likely to influence negatively the 
economy. Assuming that law and regulations are correct in the sense that they promote the 
efficient allocation of scarce resources, corruption harms the economy directly by changing 
the allocation of public resources and, indirectly, by changing incentives, prices, and 
opportunities available to workers and to entrepreneurs (Jain, 2001). The changing of 
incentives decreases the level of investment that is important on economic growth (Mauro, 
1995; Borensztein et al, 1998; Mo, 2001; Jain, 2001; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). But corrupting 
can be, at least on a theoretical point of view, positive when law and regulations are not 
correct, that is, regulations hamper the smooth running of the economy (Bardhan, 1997; 
Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2016). 
Although corruption is not limited to people with low incomes, it is more difficult to 
combat where exist “people in social distress and teetering on the edge of extreme poverty, 
[who] have few opportunities to resist the pressures of corruption.” (Bosco, 2016, pp. 67). 
To design policies to decrease the potential negative impact of corruption on well-being, it 
is essential to understand the extent of corruption: what causes it, the repercussions and the 
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potential costs that it can generate (Pelizzo et al, 2017). These elements can be measured 
objectively, by analysing activities that are more propitious to involve corruption, or 
subjectively, by using perception based-measures of corruption, such as the Corruption 
Perception Index (Pelizzo et al, 2017). Both methods have their limitations since, in the first 
case, they are expensive and based on cross-country comparisons which do not encompass 
the difference of meaning, traditions and culture of each country, and in the second case, 
they “rely on perceptions rather than objective facts” (Pelizzo et al, 2017, pp. 81). 
The present investigation aims at analysing the impact of corruption on economic growth 
of emerging economies. It is important to study these countries because they represent 
more than half of the global population (see, Table 1, pp. 13), these economies are in 
general characterized by higher than average levels of perceived corruption (for EEs 
economies, transparency perceived index is, on average weighted by GDP, 37.4 points 
while for other countries it is 54,5 points, data from CPI 2016 and WB, 2016), and the 
analysis of this phenomenon focusing these economies is scarcer and, in general, restricted 
to a small group of EEs (e.g., Moghadam et al, 2003; Uhlenbruck et al, 2006; Luo and Han, 
2009; Grande and Teixeira, 2012; Marthur and Singh, 2013; Chen et al, 2015;  Birhanu et al, 
2016; Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2016; Huang, 2016) or involving single country analysis 
(e.g., Karhunen and Ledyaeva, 2012; Mittal et al, 2012; Wu, 2014; Li, 2016). Moreover, 
several of the empirical studies focusing on EEs analyse the impacts of corruption but at a 
micro level, that is, at the level of the firms (e.g., Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Luo and Han, 
2009; Karhunen and Ledyaeva, 2012; Payne et al., 2013; Wu, 2014; Birhanu et al., 2016) or 
banks (e.g., Chen et al., 2015). 
In order to undertake such endeavor, we resort to Saconne’s (2017) classification of EEs, 
who considers 39 countries, representing 59% of the global population and 38% of global 
GDP (at purchasing power parities, constant 2011 international dollars, World Bank 
Indicators, 2016). In terms of methodology, we use panel data random effects estimation 
methodology for the period 1995-2016. 
The present dissertation is structured as follows. Next chapter focuses on a literature 
review, where we present the key concepts and the main extant literature in the area. 
Chapter 3 details the methodology, and in Chapter 4 results are presented and discussed. 
Finally, in Conclusions, the main contributions and limitations of the study are put 
forward.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1. Key concepts 
2.1.1. Corruption and economic growth 
Being an issue whose importance has been increasing over time, corruption can be defined 
as the abuse of power given by public entities for private gain (Bagashka, 2014; Gutmann 
and Lucas, 2017; Williams and Dupuy, 2017). In other words, it is related with actions 
which are not in accordance with the accepted norms and regulations and that are taken by 
public servants in order to satisfy their own interests rather than their employer’s (Jain, 
2001; Lo, 2017). The bigger the discretionary power the stronger the impulse to give in to 
bribery, ceteris paribus (Jain, 2001). According to Williams and Dupuy (2017), corruption is 
more likely to occur in environments where some people have too much power to take 
discretionary decisions and, additionally, there is no transparency about those decisions. 
Furthermore, it is more probable to happen when the legal and judicial systems have few or 
weak mechanisms to detect corruption (Jain, 2001), and it is powered by inefficient 
regulations (Trung and Kaizoji, 2017). When there is a weak judicial system or the bribers 
have a deep relationship with the values and culture of a society, the probability of corrupt 
servants being discovered and punished is small that increases the probability of deviations 
from law and regulations (Jain, 2001). In summary, corruption exists because of the co-
existence of discretionary power to allocate resources, rents related with this power and a 
judicial system where the probability of detection of illicit acts is low (Jain, 2001). 
Corruption can be seen as a typical principal-agent relationship where a third party 
influences the agent to commit an illicit action that is against the principal’s interests, in 
exchange for compensation (Gutmann and Lucas, 2017). In principal-agent relationships, 
the principals provide some power of decision to the agents in order to take advantage of 
their knowledge, abilities, networks and contacts (Wang and Murnighan, 2016). However, 
this delegation of tasks can imply a loss of information that is important for the principal, 
as sometimes the interests of both parts are not aligned (Buzogány and Häsing, 2017). This 
asymmetry of information is worst when the control mechanisms of the agent’s behaviour 
are few and/or inefficient (Jain, 2001). The weaker institutions are the ones where there is a 
higher probability of these illicit events to happen as their control mechanisms to ensure 
transparency, participation, accountability and integrity are in shortage (Williams and 
Dupuy, 2017). There are usually involved gifts or payments to public servants in exchange 
for favors that can benefit both parties: The agent, who receives the monetary 
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encouragement, and the third element, who can have more favorable conditions in the 
acquisition of goods belonging to the State or having more favorable conditions in a 
(would be) competitive market (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2016). 
Corruption can be divided into three types (Jain, 2001): (1) grand corruption, (2) 
bureaucratic corruption, and (3) legislative corruption. There are some differences between 
each type of corruption and they are related with the type of decisions, the power that is 
being used in excess and with the models available to explain the corruption (Jain, 2001). 
Specifically, grand corruption refers to the abuse of power for personal interests practiced 
by politicians and officials from the highest levels (Lo, 2017). It is expected that these 
entities serve their country and government to fulfill the society’s interests (Jain, 2001). 
However, because they have enough independency to decide about the application of laws 
and regulations, they can deviate from these objectives to satisfy their own agendas (Jain, 
2001; Lo, 2017). 
Bureaucratic corruption is the corruption practiced by bureaucrats, who are officials 
working in an organization or a government department, especially one who follows the 
rules of the department too strictly (Oxford Dictionary, 2010). It “refers to private 
payments to public officials to affect the implementation of already existing rules” 
(Bagashka, 2014, pp. 168). In hierarchical terms, the bureaucrats are above the population 
and below the political elite, which means that corruption can exist on both directions, 
from bureaucratic to population and from bureaucratic to political elite (Jain, 2001). It can 
involve, in the first case, the solicitation of higher payments to the public in order to solve 
some bureaucratic issues faster, known as petty corruption, or even to do requests that are 
not supposed to be included on the range of activities available by this kind of services and, 
in the second case, the payment for a favorable appointment (Jain, 2001). As mentioned 
before, petty corruption is related with the illicit acts practiced by officials from the lower 
levels who receive bribes in order to surpass procedures and conceive facilities in terms of 
bureaucracy (Lo, 2017). 
Finally, the legislative corruption, as the own name indicates, has to do with the influence 
that legislators can be victims of when it comes the time to vote for the approval or 
disapproval of laws or regulations (Jain, 2001).  
All of these relationships involve the use of discretionary power which concern the 
conception, interpretation and enforcement of laws and regulations. This means that is it 
more likely to find corruption in more regulated economies (Jain, 2001). If this is true, 
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then, it is expected that a reduction in regulations, i. e., an increase in liberalization, leads to 
a decrease of the corruption level (Jain, 2001). Nevertheless, this is not so linear and it 
seems that liberalization is accompanied by more corruption, at least, on short-term. Even 
though reducing regulation passes by the reduction of government’s mediation on 
economy that decreases the discretionary power of public agents, this process is conducted 
itself by the state, which means that there is an opportunity to take advantage from the 
changes to be done (Jain, 2001), for example, an economic agent is available to pay a bribe 
to be able to enter a market that was previously closed.  
Corruption can also be divided between pervasive and arbitrary corruption: the first is 
certain and widespread, representing the known cost of corruption; the second creates 
higher uncertainty, as it is never clear whether you will be requested a bribe or not and if 
the bribe you pay will produce the expected results (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
According to Cuervo-Cazurra (2016), there are two other additional ways of distinguishing 
corruption: organized versus disorganized corruption; corruption with theft versus 
corruption without theft. The first distinction is related with the fact that the corruptive 
actions can be more or less coordinated among the officials. Corruption is organized when 
there is requested only a bribe and there are no additional payments to officials whereas the 
disorganized implies that more than one official of government ask for a bribe in order to 
provide the same service (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). The second different is a result of the 
fact that sometimes even if the public pays a bribe, they also have to do the payment to the 
government (for example, taxes, permit fees). When there are both payments, the 
corruption is with theft but if there only take place the payment of the bribe, the 
corruption is without theft (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). 
Even though there are several types of corruption, we will focus our investigation in a wide 
concept of corruption (the one that is perceived by people and condensed in the 
Corruption Perception Index) because it would require more time and resources to study a 
specific kind of corruption, regradless of the country’s dimension. 
The most common variable used to reflect countries’ level of development is the Gross 
National Product (GNP) per capita; economic growth, encompassing the impact on people 
living standard, is measured by the annual relative variation of GNP per capita (Bosco, 
2016).  
 
6 
2.1.2. Emerging Economies (EEs) 
The concept of EEs is used to distinguish, among the less developed countries, those 
where growth is slow from those where growth is fast. EEs are countries with low income 
whose pace of economic growth is fast. Although EEs are still laggard from developed 
countries in terms of real product/income per capita, they are in the process of convergence 
to high levels of development (Saconne, 2017) using liberalization policies as its primordial 
mean of development (Hoskisson et al., 2017). 
Saconne (2017) proposes a two criteria for identifying/classifying an economy as EE, 
having as reference the last 15 years period data from World Bank: 1) the average level of 
GDP per capita is below the world average; and 2) the average growth rate of GDP per 
capita is higher than the world average. Using these criteria Saconne (2017) identifies a 
group of 39 economies (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1:  List of EEs, by continents 
Countries 
Population in 2016 
(millions)* 
% of World 
Population 
GDP PPP 2016 intern $ 
(billions) 
% World 
GDP 
EUROPE 
Albania 2,88 0.04% 34,31 0.03% 
Armenia 2,92 0.04% 25,79 0.02% 
Azerbaijan 9,76 0.13% 168,43 0.14% 
Belarus 9,51 0.13% 171,70 0.14% 
Bulgaria 7,13 0.10% 136,85 0.11% 
Latvia 1,96 0.03% 51,03 0.04% 
Lithuania 2,87 0.04% 86,07 0.07% 
Montenegro 0,62 0.01% 10,50 0.01% 
Poland 37,95 0.51% 1.055,35 0.88% 
Romania 19,71 0.26% 465,56 0.39% 
Serbia 7,06 0.09% 102,42 0.09% 
Turkey 79,51 1.07% 1.927,69 1.60% 
ASIA 
Bangladesh 162,95 2.19% 583,48 0.49% 
Cambodia 15,76 0.21% 58,88 0.05% 
China 1.378,67 18.53% 21.417,15 17.83% 
India 1.324,17 17.79% 8.702,90 7.24% 
Indonesia 261,11 3.51% 3.032,09 2.52% 
Kazakhstan 17,80 0.24% 449,62 0.37% 
Myanmar 52,89 0.71% 305,30 0.25% 
Philippines 103,32 1.39% 806,54 0.67% 
Sri Lanka 21,20 0.28% 261,14 0.22% 
Thailand 68,86 0.93% 1.164,93 0.97% 
Turkmenistan 5,66 0.08% 95,59 0.08% 
Uzbekistan 31,85 0.43% 207,47 0.17% 
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Vietnam 92,70 1.25% 595,52 0.50% 
AFRICA 
Angola 28,81 0.39% 187,26 0.16% 
Ethiopia 102,40 1.38% 177,66 0.15% 
Ghana 28,21 0.38% 121,11 0.10% 
Morocco 35,28 0.47% 280,72 0.23% 
Mozambique 28,83 0.39% 35,09 0.03% 
Nigeria 185,99 2.50% 1.091,23 0.91% 
Tanzania 55,57 0.75% 150,34 0.13% 
Uganda 41,49 0.56% 76,70 0.06% 
Zambia 16,59 0.22% 65,08 0.05% 
AMERICA 
Chile 17,91 0.24% 429,12 0.36% 
Colombia 48,65 0.65% 688,82 0.57% 
Dominican Rep. 10,65 0.14% 161,96 0.13% 
Peru 31,77 0.43% 413,76 0.34% 
Uruguay 3,44 0.05% 74,48 0.06% 
 
World Total 7.442,14 
 
120.141,76 
 
EE countries 4.354,42 59% 45.869,63 38% 
Source: World Bank Database, in https://data.worldbank.org (access on 4/10/2017 and 1/11/2017) 
 
These economies represent, as shown on the table above, almost 60% of the global 
population and 38% of the world’s GDPppp (data of 2016). 
During the last twenty years, many studies were conducted to understand the impact of 
corruption on EEs in diverse areas: firms, banks, economies and people’s behavior. By 
revising the past, we can conclude that a greater emphasis has been given to study its 
consequences on companies’ performance (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2016; Payne et al, 
2013), which factors can determine the higher or lower level of corruption behind the 
organizational activities (Wu, 2014; Luo and Han, 2009), and the influence of corruption 
on firm’s strategies (Karhunen and Ledyaeva, 2012). 
According to Williams and Martinez-Perez’s (2016) research, there is a belief that 
companies can only reach high results if they bribe public servants in order to benefit in a 
competitive market. In other words, they concluded that in EEs the relation between 
corruption and firm’s performance is positive, which means that an increase in the level of 
corruption leads to an improvement of the resourcefulness of the companies. 
On the other hand, certain characteristics of a company can also influence the level of 
corruption that exists in it. For example, firms that include corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) in their strategy usually have lower levels of corruption (Wu, 2014). There are several 
external and internal factors that can affect the companies’ behavior in the market, such as 
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the pressures exerted by competition and government forces (Wu, 2014), whose effects can 
include a higher level of illicit actions. The firms that possess institutional or competitive 
advantages, as expected, have lower degrees of corruption (Luo and Han, 2009). This also 
occurs in “firms whose ownership is partially shared by government or foreign investment” 
(Luo and Han, 2009, pp. 234). 
Another important aspect studied is the impact of corruption in banking. Recent research 
suggests that higher levels of corruption are related with a higher risk acceptance by banks 
(Chen et al, 2015). One of the reasons that can explain the lower profits and its wider 
variation is the corruption, which has a negative effect and even larger banks can be victims 
of this problem (Chen et al, 2015). 
However, in order to have a more encompassing perspective, there is a need of studying 
and comparing distinct economies. As mentioned before, corruption affects the levels of 
investment of a country, and the perceptions about corruption have the same effect. Thus, 
when corruption perceptions are high, the incoming levels of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) tend to be low (Marthur and Singh, 2013). Marthur and Singh (2013) also conclude 
that the level of investment entering in a country can be affected by its level of democracy, 
specifically they found that “more democratic countries receive less inflows” (Marthur and 
Singh, 2013, pp. 1001). Another research, considering the countries whose official language 
is the Portuguese (PALOP’s1), realized corruption is crucial to define the FDI inflows, and 
support the content that the countries’ culture and history is not sufficient to overcome the 
costs of institutional weaknesses (Grande and Teixeira, 2012). 
Even though there is a wide range of studies about corruption in EEs, the ones mentioned 
before do not cover simultaneously all the EEs, and/or are based on firm level data which 
requires purposely and expensive data collection. 
 
2.2. Impact of corruption and other determinants of economic growth 
GNP per capita growth is influenced by several determinants, most notably (see Kong and 
Volkema, 2016) capital intensity, both physical and human, and technological level. 
Economic policies, culture, human development, globalization, and institutional quality 
(embracing political and legal dimensions), proxied by measures such as the size of public 
sector, cultural traditions, human capita/education, population ageing, trade openness, and 
                                                          
1PALOP – Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, it includes Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique and Sao Tome Principe (Grandre and Teixeira, 2012). 
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level of corruption, also influence the evolution of GNP per capita (Bosco, 2016; Saconne, 
2017).  
Bellow we detail the several ways through which corruption, and other key variables, affect 
economic growth (see Mo, 2001).  
 
2.2.1. The impact of corruption on economic growth 
During the last decades, several studies have debated whether the corruption “grease the 
wheels” or “is sand” on the economic growth (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). In the first, 
optimistic, approach, it is considered that corruption has a significant and positive effect on 
economic development (see Paul, 2010; Huang, 2016) as it facilitates the commercial 
changes in some bureaucratic aspects allowing the existence of a competitive market rather 
than a monopoly (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). The “grease the wheels” theory states that 
corruption helps the development of an economy when there are inefficiencies on the 
market created by incompetent bureaucratic and long-lasting processes that create an 
impediment to investment (Leys, 1965; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). There are several aspects 
that can be compensated by corruption in a country with an ill-functioning bureaucratic 
system, such as the speeding of the process of creating a firm, for example, allowing a 
decrease in the queue (Leys, 1965; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). By doing it, more companies 
can be built in a shorter period of time than if there were no bribes or the cut of red tape 
and, as a result, the capacity of production of a country can be increased (Leys, 1965). 
The second point of view, the more widely accepted one, considers that corruption means 
higher uncertainty and, as a consequence, higher costs not only for the companies but also 
for the economy as a whole (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). This point of view has as support the 
fact that there is strong empirical evidence that links high corruption levels with smaller 
GDP per capita.  
Corruption decreases GDPpc level by changing incentives and prices that causes non-
efficient allocation of scarce resources. This misallocation of resources involves wrong 
decisions taken by the government about the destination of public funds and the 
acceptance of certain private investments (Jain, 2001). In order to maintain high incomes 
from corruption and the secrecy within a small group, the corrupt members of government 
can, for instance, allocate government funds in few big contracts rather than applying it for 
smaller contracts that would be better to population where it would be harder for the 
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corrupt agent to have gains (Bardhan, 1997). This happens because it is easier to control 
the level of corruption when the delegation of power is low (Buzogány and Häsing, 2017; 
Williams and Dupuy, 2017). There is also a lack of efficiency in the re-allocation of 
resources from firms’ normal activities for more profitable illegal purposes (Mo, 2001). 
Corruption might also decreases GDPpc growth by reducing investment, due to not only 
an increase in the risk, by introducing instability in the legal frame work (Marthur and 
Singh, 2013), but also a decrease in opportunities available to entrepreneurs, as they can 
receive less income and experience a higher level of uncertainty (Jain, 2001; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008). As underlined by Marthur and Singh (2013, pp. 1001), “the more corrupt a 
country is perceived to be, the less the flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to that 
country” (Jain, 2001). 
Empirical evidence shows that corruption does not have the same impact on economic 
growth in all countries or group of countries. This differences are related not only with the 
characteristics of each country (size, political forces, legal framework, regulations), but also 
with the variables used in the model that are different according with the approach of each 
scholar. Mauro (1995) found a significant negative relation between a corruption index and 
economic growth. 
Table 2 summarises some recent studies (2016 and 2017) detailing the different countries 
or group of countries analysed, the period of time, and the variables used to measure 
corruption, as well as the model and the main results. 
Table 2: List of empirical studies about the effect of corruption on economic growth 
Author 
(Year) 
Analysed 
Countries 
No. of 
countri
es 
Period Variable to measure 
corruption 
Model Relation 
between 
corruptio
n and 
economi 
growth 
Chang and 
Hao (2017) 
Global 87 2002-
2012 
Level of corruption 
indicators compiled by the 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽1∆𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡)
2
+ 𝛽4[𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
× 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡]
+ 𝛽5
′ ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡
+ (𝜂𝑡 − 𝜂𝑡−1) + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 
negative 
Neanidis et 
al (2017) 
Italy 1 1983-
2009 
Official number of crimes 
against public 
administration per 100,000 
inhabitants reported to the 
police and published by 
the Italian National 
Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT) 
𝑔𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3(𝑂𝐶 × 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟)𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑋𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗  
negative 
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Huang 
(2016) 
Asian-Pacific 13 1997-
2013 
Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) 
Bootstrap panel 
Granger causality 
analysis 
Not 
significant
* 
Li (2016) China 1 1999-
2006 
Provincial corruption rate 
(From China Statistical 
Yearbook) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐
= 𝛼
+ 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝛸𝛾 + 𝜀 
negative 
Lisciandra 
(2016) 
Italy 1 1968-
2011 
Number of crimes 
reported to prosecution 
departments resulting in 
criminal proceedings 
divided by the population 
ẏ𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝜌ẏ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛽
+ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
negative 
Tsanana 
(2016) 
EU enlarged 27 1995-
2012 
Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑐1𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑐2𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−2
+ 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐻𝐶
+ 𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝐹𝐷𝐼 ∗ 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝐷𝑈𝑀08𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑅13𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼11𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐵𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼13𝐵𝑈𝑅13𝑖,𝑡 
positive 
*With exception of South Korea where the impact is significant positive. 
 
Most of the studies undertook concluded that the impact of corruption on economic 
growth is negative, which means that more corrupt countries evidence lower GDPpc 
growth (Li, 2016; Lisciandra, 2016; Chang and Hao, 2017; Neanidis et al, 2017).  
Nonetheless, there are several studies where the impact of corruption is not statistically 
significant (see Huang, 2016), with some few evidencing that the existence of corruption 
can even contribute to the economic growth (“greasing the wheels” in inefficient regulatory 
framework) and, goes deeper claiming that the cost incurred from measures taken by the 
government against the corruption and bureaucracy are not always beneficial for economic 
growth (Tsanana et al, 2016; Huang, 2016).  
Chang and Hao (2017) used a set of indicators related with the level of corruption 
compiled by the International Country Risk Guide to measure the impact of corruption on 
economic growth, from 2002 until 2012. The estimations, resorting to OLS regressions, 
prove that corruption impacts negatively on economic growth. Neanidis et al (2017) 
concluded the same using the official number of crimes against public administration per 
100000 inhabitants within the period 1983-2009. Differently from these studies, Huang 
(2016) used a Bootstrap Panel Granger causality analysis, between 1997 and 2013, where 
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the measure of corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) obtaining not 
statistically significant estimates for all countries with exception of South Korea. Li (2016) 
and Lisciandra (2016) analysed only one country, respectively from 1999 until 2006 and 
1968-2001. They both estimated OLS regressions but the variable used to measure 
corruption was different: Li (2016) used the provincial corruption rate, whereas Lisciandra 
(2016) usedthe number of crimes reported to prosecution departments resulting in criminal 
proceedings. Finally, resorting to OLS estimations Tsanana et al (2016) used the CPI to 
measure the impact of corruption on economic growth from 1995 to 2012 in enlarged EU 
and concluded that it has a positive impact on economic growth. 
Considering the countries analysed, we can observe in the studies conducted by Huang et al 
(2016) and by Li (2016), about thirteen Asian-Pacific countries and China, respectively, the 
impact of corruption on economic growth was either not significant or negative. In 
comparison, other studies (Lisciandra, 2016; Neanidis, 2017) that investigate this impact in 
Italy, which is a developed country, also reach similar results by concluding that corruption 
affects negatively the economic growth. 
Given the above synthesis, we conjecture that the impact of corruption on economic 
growth of emerging economies is similar to the impact on the other economies. Even 
though, considering the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as an adequate variable to 
measure the impact of corruption on Emerging Economies and using different control 
variables than the ones included on these studies, we want to test whether the scenario is 
different between the Emerging Economies and the other counties, as the Emerging 
Economies are countries with higher economic growth and corruption. 
H1: Corruption impacts on countries’ economic growth. 
H2: The impact of corruption on emerging economies’ economic growth is different from 
the impact on remaining countries. 
 
2.2.2. The impact of other determinants on economic growth 
Technological diffusion 
Technological diffusion can be considered as the increase in productivity induced from 
all unpaid production factors, i.e., that do not result from the increase in capital intensity 
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Empirical evidence shows that technological diffusion 
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depends primarily on the existing gap among countries in the level of technology (Nelson 
and Phelps, 1966) due to the possible use of technologies developed in developed 
countries by developing economies (Filippetti and Payrache, 2016). This transfer of 
technological knowledge from developed economies to emerging economies occurs 
because, after using a technology for a long period of time, legal protection decreases 
(with the expiry of patents and copyright) and it eventually becomes obsolete in the 
original country (it stops increasing the productivity of the original country). Then, 
although it becomes useless for that original country, it is still suitable for less developed 
economies. In other words, the most developed countries are nearer from the 
technological frontier while the less developed countries are further away from it, which 
explains higher productivity growth rates in developing countries when compared with 
developed economies (Verspagen, 1991).  
In the end, there will be a catching up effect, i.e., the GDP per capita of less developed 
economies will converge to that of the most developed countries (Verspagen, 1991). 
Globalization, by enabling easier movement of people and goods, allows a faster sharing 
of knowledge between countries, especially between developed economies to less 
developed ones (Filippetti and Payrache, 2016). It is important to highlight that 
technological diffusion involves knowledge that already exists that flows without a 
registration as capital or merchandise. 
Table 3 summarizes the studies that focused on the impact of technological diffusion on 
economic growth, considering different variables and periods of time. 
Table 3: List of empiric studies about the effect of technological diffusion on economic growth 
Author 
(Year) 
Analysed 
Countries 
Number 
of 
countries 
Period 
Variable to measure 
technological 
diffusion 
Model Results 
Naanaa 
and 
Sellaouti 
(2017) 
Tunisia  
1970-
2012 
The sector of ICT 
(information and 
communication 
technologies) output 
growth in 
manufacturing; 
Percentage of 
employed people 
acquired tertiary 
education. 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐺𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑃𝑡
+ 𝛼2𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛼3𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝐹𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑡 
significant  
positive 
effect 
Jalles 
(2010) 
World 73 
1980-
2005 
the ratio of total 
number of patents to 
100,000 inhabitants 
registered in the US 
market; Intellectual 
Property 
Rights Index 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝛾 + ∑ 𝛼𝑜𝑡
5
𝑡=𝑖
+ 𝛼1𝑖𝑡𝑋1𝑖𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑋2𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=2
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
positive 
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Information and communication technologies at least partially explain the impact of 
technological diffusion on economic growth. Naanaa and Sellaouti (2017) analyzing Tunisia 
for the period from 1970 until 2012, found evidence that technology diffusing (proxied by 
the share of ICT sector) significantly and positively  affected that country’s economic 
growth. Jalles (2010) also acknowledged this positive impact on his study considering 73 
economies for the period 1980-2005. He considered two proxies to measure the 
technological diffusion, the ratio of total number of patents to 100,000 inhabitants 
registered in the US market, and the Intellectual Property Rights Index.  
 
 
Investment 
Investment is an important determinant of economic growth (Baharumshah and 
Almasaied, 2009; Tsanana et al, 2016) – see Table 4. It encompasses both Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and the domestic investment (Lee and Tan, 2006, Merican, 2009; 
Tsanana et al, 2016).  
The FDI is not only an important channel of increasing the volume of capital in a country 
(as domestic investment) but also its efficiency (Li and Liu, 2005) due to the fact that it is 
also a knowledge diffusion path that has a great impact in other economic aspects, such as 
the catching-up effect (Borenszteina et al, 1998; Lee and Tan, 2006; Merican, 2009) and it 
boosts the access to advanced technologies and new markets by developing countries 
(Borenzteina et al, 1998). FDI involves a transfer of technology and knowledge, which 
means that it is possible to increase the capital factor, both physical and human 
(Borenzeina et al, 1998).  
Being capital important in explaining productivity (Sollow, 1965), increasing the capital 
intensity will result in economic growth. Consequently, the higher the investment, the 
higher the economic growth. However, the impact of FDI is dependent on the countries’ 
economic, institutional and technological environment (Li and Liu, 2005). 
Table 4 presents some empirical evidence about the impact of investment on economic 
growth, showing that there is evidence of investment’s positive effect on an economy (i.e., 
countries with a higher level of investment tend to growth faster). 
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Table 4: List of empiric studies about the effect of investment on economic growth 
Author 
(Year) 
Analysed 
Countries 
Number 
of 
countries 
Period 
Variable to 
measure 
investent 
Model Results 
Tsanana et 
al  (2016) 
EU enlarged 27 
1995-
2012 
Investment share 
(% of GDP); 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
inflows (% of 
GDP) 
 
Significant 
positive 
effect 
Merican 
(2009) 
ASEAN-4 
nations 
(Malaysia, 
Thailand, 
Indonesia, 
Philippines) 
4 
Last 
three 
decades 
Nominal Gross 
Domestic 
Investment in 
terms of % 
nominal GDP; 
Nominal FDI 
inflows in terms of 
% nominal GDP 
𝑌𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑇𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐻𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
significant 
positive 
effect 
Baharums
hah and 
Almasaied 
(2009) 
Malasya 1 
1974-
2004 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡)
+ 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 
significant 
positive 
effect 
Lee and 
Tan 
(2006) 
ASEAN 
nations 
(Malaysia, 
Thailand, 
Indonesia, 
Singapore) 
4  
Foreign Direct 
Investment inflow 
to host country, 
Domestic 
investment of host 
country 
𝐺𝐷𝑃
= 𝑐1 + 𝑐2𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑀
+ 𝑑3𝐹𝐷𝐼 + 𝑑4𝐷𝐼
+ 𝑑5𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝑑6𝐼𝑀𝑃
+ 𝜀 
 
positive 
Khan and 
Kumar 
(1997) 
Developing 
countries 
95 
1970-
1990 
  positive 
Auerbach 
et al (1994) 
World 61 
1960-
1985 
The average share 
of real equipment 
investment in 
GDP; the 
corresponding 
share for 
structures 
investment 
𝐷𝑌𝐿
= 𝑐 + 𝛽𝐸𝑖𝐸 + 𝛽𝑆𝑖𝑆 + 𝜃
∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐷𝐿 + 𝜖 
 
positive in 
rich 
countries 
 
Tsanana et al (2016) uses a cross-sectional regression where the Investment share (% of 
GDP) and Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (% of GDP), are the variables used to 
measure investment. By using this model and considering the sample mentioned before, 
the author concludes that investment has a significantly positive effect on economic 
growth. The same conclusion is taken by Merican (2009) for his study about the AESEAN-
4 economies (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines) for the last three decades, using 
autoregressive distributive lag methods. Considering Malaysia for the period 1974-2004, 
Baharumshah and Almasaied (2009) use FDI to measure the impact of investment on 
economic growth which emerged as positive and significant. 
Lee and Tan’s (2006), Kan and Kumar’s (1997) and Auerbach et al.’s (1994) research goes in 
the same direction, but the impact is not statistically significant. Lee and Tan (2006) use 
Granger causality tests to measure the impact of changes in investment on economic 
growth of ASEAN nations (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore). Using a Cobb-
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Douglas production, Kan and Kumar (1997) found a positive impact of investment on the 
growth of 95 developing countries between 1970 and 1990. For developed countries and 
considering the average share of real equipment investment in GDP Auerbach et al. (1994) 
also found a positive impact. 
 
Human Capital 
Human capital results from the process of accumulation of knowledge and know-how 
carried out over time and it includes the formal education, training and learning by doing 
undertaken by individuals throughout their lives, (Becker, 1994). To measure the human 
capital that results inside the production process is very difficult, so, usually the full-time 
formal education is used as a proxy to it due to the fact that the development by the 
experience during the practice of a professional activity is dependent on formal education, 
in other words, when an individual starts a career he/she acquires knowledge faster when 
schooling level is high. Human capital increases the individual’s productivity and, as a 
consequence, the economic growth. However, this relationship is not easy to measure and 
it depends on the ways that human beings distribute their time doing the different tasks 
related with their profession (Lucas, 1998). 
Human capital affects economic growth, being considered a key determinant of economic 
growth (see, Eigbinemelon and Anaduaka, 2014; Narayan and Smyth, 2004; Lucas, 1998; 
Barro, 1996). It refers to the capacities of human beings, both physical and psychological, 
of a country; in other words, it is the combination of know-how, skills and abilities of the 
labor force (Eigbinemelon and Anaduaka, 2014). On the other hand, human capital 
development implies the increase of the number of skilled people (Eigbinemelon and 
Anaduaka, 2014). 
Nayaran and Russel (2004) consider that one of the reasons for economic growth is the 
improvement on productivity reached by the increase on the educational levels of a 
country. Human capital development is essential for the enhancement of economic and 
political conditions, which is proved by the existing evidence related with the developed 
and newly industrializing economies (Eigbinemelon and Anaduaka, 2014) 
There is substantial empirical evidence of the positive effect of human capital on economic 
growth – see Table 5.  
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Table 5: List of empirical studies about the impact of human capital on economic growth 
Author 
(Year) 
Analysed 
Countries 
Number 
of 
countries 
Period 
Variable to measure 
investment 
Model Results 
Eigbirem
olen and 
Anaduaka 
(2014) 
Nigeria 1 
1999-
2012 
Product of secondary 
school enrollment and 
total labour force; 
government total 
expenditure on 
education 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼0𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐾
+ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔ℎ𝐿
+ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝑇𝐸𝐸 + 𝑊 
 
significant 
positive effect 
Merican 
(2009) 
ASEAN-4 
nations 
(Malasya, 
Thailand, 
Indonesia, 
Philippines) 
4 
Last 
three 
decades 
Adult illiteracy rate 
(%) 
𝑌𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑂𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑇𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐻𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
significant 
positive effect 
Narayan 
and 
Smyth 
(2004) 
China 1 
1960-
1999 
weighted index of 
educational 
attainment from five 
levels of schooling: 
primary, 
junior secondary, 
senior secondary, 
special secondary and 
tertiary 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡
= 𝛼0
+ ∑ 𝛼1∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛼2∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝛼3∆𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐶𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0
+ 𝑘𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
positive 
Bloom et 
al (2004) 
World 1 
1960-
1990 
Average years of 
schooling; Average 
work experience of 
the work force; 
Average square of 
work experience 
𝑌
= 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿𝛽𝑒𝜙1𝑠+𝜙2𝑒𝑥𝑝+𝜙3𝑒𝑥𝑝
2+𝜙4
ℎ
 
 
significant 
positive effect 
Wang 
and Yao 
(2003) 
China 1 
1952-
1999 
number of average 
effective years of 
schooling per person 
in the 14–65 age 
group 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼(𝐿𝑡𝐻𝑡) 
𝛽
 positive 
Agioming
ianakis et 
al (2002) 
World 93  
Review of previous 
studies 
𝑌(𝑡)
= 𝐾(𝑡)𝛼𝐻(𝑡)𝛽[𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)](1−𝛼−𝛽) 
 
positive 
Barro 
(1996) 
World 100 
1960-
1990 
Review of previous 
studies 
 
significant 
positive effect 
 
The methods used and the countries analyzed are very different among studies. However, 
in general, the conclusions point to a positive impact of human capital oneconomic 
growth. Eigbiremolen and Anaduaka (2014) analyze Nigeria in the period 1999-2012 using 
an augmented Solow human-capital-growth model. For measuring human capital they use 
as a proxy the product of secondary school enrollment and total labor force and the 
government total expenditure on education. They conclude that human capital has a 
significant and positive impact on economic growth. Merican (2009) also reaches the same 
result for the ASEAN-4 nations (Malasya, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines), using data 
from the last three decades applied in an Autoregressive Distributive Lag model. He 
proxied human capital using the adult illiteracy rate (%). Measuring human capital by a 
weighted index of educational attainment from five levels of schooling - primary, junior 
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secondary, senior secondary, special secondary and tertiary - Narayan and Smyth (2004) 
resorted to a co-integration and error-correction model for the period 1960-1999, and 
concluded that human capital has a positive impact on Chinese economic growth. Also for 
China, Wang and Yao (2003) use a simple growth-accounting framework, considering the 
number of average effective years of schooling per person in the 14–65 age group as a 
proxy of human capital, and obtain the same result - human capital has a positive impact 
on growth. Bloom et al (2004), Agiomingianakis et al (2002), and Barro (1996) extended the 
analysis for a wider group of countries, reaching a similar result.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
One of the challenges of measuring the impact of corruption on economic growth lays on 
the fact that the (corrupt) acts are hidden in order to avoid catching the attention of the 
public, making difficult its analysis (Jain, 2001; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016).  
One of the possibilities of studying this phenomenon is by doing surveys. In order to do it 
faster and by taking advantage from new technologies, they can be answered in computers 
or, more recently, trough mobile apps, such as the Bribecaster, especially created for this 
purpose, to understand better the perceptions of society about corruption (Mittal et al, 
2012). However, these techniques are expensive and some countries, such as the EEs, do 
not have a significant size that justifies the financial expenditure on this kind of studies.  
Thus, we opted to use data collected by well-known institutions, most notably the 
Transparency International which provides data for the corruption proxy (the Corruption 
Perceptions Index Index), and the World Bank, which provides the data for the remaining 
variables. 
For the full database encompasses a period of 21 years (1995-2016) and 217 countries, 
including the 39 EEs, which means that we could potentially have 4557 observations. 
However, to have a more accurate model, we excluded the points with missing values and 
related to countries with less than 5 observations. From this, we obtained an unbalanced 
panel data with 1919 points for 158 countries (a panel with a density of 49,9% that 
represents 67,3% of world population) – see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Sample density - countries that have, at least, CPI values in one year 
 
The basic model chosen to study the impact of corruption on economic growth was the 
Solow model, which establishes a positive relationship between GNP (Y) and technological 
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progress (A), capital (K) and labor (L) factors, which means that an increase in each 
variable will induce an increase in the product (Solow, 1956). 
𝑌 = 𝐴 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) 
As mentioned before, economic growth is measured by the relative annual increase in 
GDPpc, which means that we need to divide both members of the equation by the 
population (N). By doing it, we have the equation below: 
𝑌
𝑁
=
𝐴
𝑁
 𝑓 (
𝐾
𝑁
) ⇔  𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑝𝑐 =
𝐴
𝑁
 𝑓 (
𝐾
𝑁
) 
 
The economic growth is the variation of GDPpc throughout the years and, as follows: 
∆𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑝𝑐 =  ∆
𝐴
𝑁
+  ∆
𝐾
𝑁
 
 
To this basic model, we add variables for the technological diffusion, measured by the 
proxy (GDPpc, in PPP), the physical capital variation, measured by the Liquid Capital 
Formation per capita (LCFpc), the schooling enrolment (SEPS) and, as our core, 
independent variable, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which is the perception-
based measure for corruption. We also consider a first dummy (D), which assumes the 
value 1 when the country is an Emerging Economy (EE) and 0 otherwise, and a second 
multiplicative dummy (D.CPI) that measures whether the impact of corruption on 
economic growth of EE is different from the remaining  countries. From this, we reach the 
following econometric specification: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑐 +  𝛽3𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑃𝐼 + 𝛽5𝐷 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐶𝑃𝐼
+ 𝜀 
 
The LCFpc is measured by the difference between the Gross Capital Formation (GCF), the 
Consumption of Fixed Capital (CFC) and the Population Growth (PG). 
𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑐 = 𝐺𝐶𝐹 + 𝐶𝐹𝐶 + 𝑃𝐺 
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To measure the human capital we chose the school enrolment of primary and secondary 
(SEPS), as follows: 
𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑆 =
(5𝑆𝐸𝑃 + 7𝑆𝐸𝑆)
12
 
We considered five years of school enrolment of primary and seven years of secondary, 
weighted by twelve, which is the sum of those years. 
As the countries are very different in size and data available, the model will be doubly 
weighted: 1) by using the GDPpc, in PPP, to mitigate differences in the size of the 
economies; 2) to overcome the fact that the panel is unbalance, we divide the GDPpc, in 
PPP, by the number of points each country has in the panel, so that each point from a 
countries with more points is less weighted: 
𝑤(𝑗,𝑖) =
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑗,𝑖) ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑗,𝑖)
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖
 
We estimate two models that are W-OLS regressions. 
 
Model 1: All countries of the sample (estimated by panel data random effects) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙1 = lm (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑟~𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑃𝐶 + 𝐶𝑃𝐼 + 𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑆,  
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒, 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒$𝑤) 
 
Model 2: Emerging Economies (estimated by panel data random effects) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙2 = lm (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑟~𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝐿𝐶𝐹𝑃𝐶 + 𝐶𝑃𝐼 + 𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝐷 + 𝐷𝐶𝑃𝐼,  
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 = 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒, 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒$𝑤) 
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Chapter 4. Empirical results 
The main aim of the present dissertation is to assess the impact of corruption on economic 
growth of EE, by comparison to other countries, over the period ranging from 1995 to 
2015. 
The econometric specifications include (see Table 6), beside the corruption proxy, other 
main determinants of economic growth, namely technological diffusion, physical 
investment, human capital, and two dummies that permit to highlight the eventual distinct  
impact of corruption on the economic growth of EEs compared to that impact on other 
countries. 
Table 6: Random effect panel estimation (dependent variable: growth in GDP pc), 1995-2015 
Independent variable Description 
Model 1 
RE 
 
Model 2 
RE 
 
CPI 
‘Corruption Perception Index’ (the higher the CPI, 
the higher the level of transparency, the lower the 
corruption) 
0.038*** 
(6.79) 
+0.032*** 
(5.36) 
GDPpc PPP Gross Domestic Product per capita (in PPP) 
-0.052*** 
(-7.72) 
-0.029 
(-4.17) 
LCFPC Liquid Capital Formation per capita (% of GDP) 
+0.257*** 
(26.16) 
+0.203*** 
(17.79) 
SEPS Schooling enrolment, primary and secondary 
-0.025*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.013 
(-1.95) 
D Dummy (1 if the country is an EE and 0 if not)  
+2.371*** 
(3.76) 
DCPI Dummy of the multiplicative D*CPI  
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
Constant  
+1.805** 
(2.96) 
+0.422 
(0.65) 
Multiple R2 
 
0.42 0.44 
*Significant at 0.1% level; **Significant at 1% level; ***Significant at 5% level 
 
Globally the variables included in the models explain about 43% (42% for the model 1 and 
44% for Model 2) of the variance of the GDPpc growth variable that is good in a panel 
data estimation. 
Estimates obtained (either in Model 1 or Model 2) suggest that, all the remaining factors 
being held constant, countries with lower level of percept corruption (i.e., higher CPI,  
more transparent), have a higher economic growth. Thus, our main hypothesis (H1) is 
validated, confirming our conjecture about the negative impact of corruption on economic 
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growth of countries. It is therefore in accordance with several studies (see Li, 2016; 
Lisciandra, 2016; Chang and Hao, 2017; Neanidis et al, 2017) and consequently with the 
“sand in the wheels” theory. 
Emerging economies are associated with higher economic growth rates when compared 
with developed economies, so we conjectured that the impact of corruption on economic 
growth would differs between the EEs and the rest of the countries.  However, analyzing 
the results our conjecture is not in accordance with the data: We observe that the impact of 
corruption on economic growth of EEs is similar to the impact verified on the other 
economies, which means that the H2 hypothesis is not confirmed. In other words, 
independently of the rate of economic growth of economies, the higher the level of 
corruption, the lower the economic rate of growth. 
In accordance with existing literature, we observe that the countries with higher 
GDPpcPPP have a lower growth. This happens, we conjecture, due to technological 
diffusion. It is also in accordance with literature the result that countries with higher liquid 
investment rate have higher economic growth rate. There was an unexpected result related 
with school enrolment: Contrary to literature, we observe that countries with higher school 
enrollment have a lower economic growth. 
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Conclusion 
On the last decades, several scholars have studied corruption and its implications in the 
most diverse fields, namely, its impact on economic growth. Even though there have been 
done significant progresses, there is still no agreement whether the impact of corruption on 
economic growth is positive, negatively or non-significant. We can state that  both 
perspectives of the impact of corruption on economic growth, the “grease the wheels” 
theory and the “sand in the wheels”, have receive some empirical support (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008). 
Extant empirical studies have focused on different countries or group of countries but did 
not pay attention to the whole group of the so-called Emerging Economies (39 countries, 
according to Saccone, 2017), which represent almost 60% of the global population. In 
concrete, the few empirical studies that focused on EEs consider either one or a small set 
of EEs or encompass micro level analysis (banks, firms …) rather than macro/economic 
growth analyses. 
Aiming at overcoming this literature gap, the main goal of the present dissertation was to 
assess the impact of corruption on economic growth of Emerging Economies, comparing 
it to that of the remaining countries. Given the characteristics of EEs, which are economies 
with low income but that are growing in economic terms at a fast pace, converging to the 
more developed countries, it could expected that corruption would have a different impact 
on economic growth, comparing with the remaining countries.  
To pursue this goal, we used an unbalanced panel data from the World Bank and the 
Transparency International, covering the period from 1995 to 2015. 
The results achieved are in accordance with the majority of the studies done about the 
impact of corruption on economic growth of emerging economies, which conclude it has a 
negative impact, i. e., the higher the level of corruption, the lower the economic growth. 
Even though some studies find evidence of its positive impact, the “sand in the wheels” 
theory prevails. We could also conclude that this impact on EEs is not different from the 
impact on the other countries of the world. The model 2, which allows that comparison by 
including the multiplicative dummy DCPI, confirms that the impact of corruption on EEs 
is not significantly distinct from the impact on the other countries. 
One of the limitations of the present investigation is related with the fact that the variable 
used to measure corruption, the CPI, is based on perceptions which might not reflect a real 
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image of what corruption is and its impact on economic growth, as it depends on people’s 
opinions that can be different from country to country. On our models we are also not 
considering the possible causality between corruption and the control variables 
(technological diffusion, human capital and investment), which mean that we are neglecting 
nonlinearities of corruption on economic growth. 
Other limitation is related with the fact that our result about the impact of human capital 
on economic growth is contrary to existing literature, it deserves further study to identify 
the causes of this disagreement.  However, due to the fact that the aim of our study is just 
to measure the impact of corruption on growth and this variable is used just as control 
variable in order not to compromise the centricity of the estimator of the impact of 
corruption on growth, it is a study that is not central to the present dissertation. We 
conjecture that this result could be due to the endogeneity of the variables “Scholl 
enrollment”, which is a proxy for measure human capital and it is not probably the most 
adequate. 
Finally, it is expected that the present dissertation contributes to the existing literature by 
providing not only a global acknowledgement about what corruption is and its implications 
at an economical level but also to enlarge the range of countries studied in what respects to 
the topic of the impact of corruption on economic growth. 
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